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ABSTRACT 
This research studies the accountability and performance of public sector organizations. It 
provides empirical evidence about the relationship between the use of a performance measurement 
system and the organizational factors of accountability and organizational performance. We 
investigate the three roles of a performance measurement system (its operational use, incentive use, 
and exploratory use), and three organizational factors (contractibility, the legislative mandate, and 
management commitment). A mixed method approach with squential explanatory design was used to 
answer the research question. The hyphoteses testing used Structural Equation Modelling-Partial 
Least Square (SEM-PLS). Our findings were based on survey data from 137 SKPD officers in the 
local government of Yogyakarta Province, and showed that management commitment had a positive 
association with accountability and organizational performance. We also found a positive association 
between the legislative mandate and accountability. However, this research did not find any 
significant association among the three roles of the performance measurement system with 
accountability and organizational performance. Based on the institutional theory, our findings show 
substantial contributions by the institutional isomorphism, which was used in an appropriate manner 
to explain the context of public sector organizations, especially in the local government of Yogyakarta 
Province. 
Keywords:  the use of performance measurement system, organizational factors, accountability, 
mixed method.	
INTRODUCTION 
New Public Management (NPM) was 
introduced in Europe in the 1980s and has been 
widely adopted by public sector organizations, 
especially government agencies. The concept of 
NPM became an alternative method for the 
management of public sector organizations that 
were considered to be unsuccessful. The large 
public demand for transparancy and accoun-
tability prompted a new paradigm in the 
management of organizations that led to the 
adoption of the NPM concepts. In the spirit of 
reform implemention, the NPM’s concepts 
became a major change for achieving the 
objectives of public sector organizations. 
Christensen and Laegreid (2014) revealed that 
reform in implementing NPM aimed to: (1) 
improve the efficiency of the public sector, (2) 
enhance the responsiveness of public agencies to 
their clients and customers, and (3) improve 
accountability.  
One of the key elements that should be 
considered in the implementation of NPM is a 
performance measurement system. Performance 
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measurement is one of the keys to success for 
public sector organizations to achieve their 
objectives. Several studies have shown that, 
through the appropriate measurement and 
management of performance, organizations will 
obtain various benefits, such as: (1) the moti-
vation of the employees at all levels of the 
organization, (2) the creation of a performance 
improvement culture, (3) the formulation, 
implementation, and review of organizational 
strategy, and (4) an overall improved perfor-
mance by the organization (Micheli and Mari, 
2014). Nevertheless, NPM practices that em-
phasize the role of a performance measurement 
system in target setting, performance evaluation, 
and incentives provision are still problematic 
(Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). There are two 
reasons that cause these problems to occur. The 
first is that NPM’s exclusive focus on the role of 
performance measurement systems in accoun-
tability and incentive provision is too narrow. 
Some literature suggests that performance 
measurement systems can serve various different 
purposes and can be applied in a variety of 
different ways. By ignoring these other roles, 
NPM disregards the performance consequences 
of alternative ways of using a performance 
measurement system (Spekle and Verbeeten, 
2014). 
The second is that NPM focuses on the role 
of performance measurement systems in 
incentive-oriented work, and this can only be 
done, and work well, in conditions of high 
contractibility, i.e. when: (1) the goals of the 
organization are clear and unambiguous, (2) 
performance can be measured in ways that are 
consistent with organizational goal achievement, 
and (3) organizational actors know and control 
the transformation processes and are able to 
predict the likely outcomes of various alternative 
courses of action. If these three conditions 
cannot be met cumulatively, performance mea-
sures will only provide a partial representation of 
the main objectives of the organization, so that a 
strong emphasis on result targets is likely to 
have dysfunctional consequences. That is 
because the incentives induce the organizational 
actors to focus on target achievement rather than 
on organizational goals (Speke and Verbeeten, 
2014).  
In general, this study wanted to test empi-
rically and provide quantitative and qualitative 
evidence of the relationship between the use of 
performance measurement systems and the 
organizational factors on the accountability and 
performance of public sector organizations. This 
is an important topic for study, in the current 
context, especially for government agencies. The 
trend for government agencies now is for them 
to report good performances and minimize 
excessive information about the failure of a 
programme. Performance reports submitted in 
the form of Government Institutions Perfor-
mance Accountability Reports (LAKIP) have 
been biased (Nurkhamid, 2008). This bias arose 
because the performances delivered did not 
match the realities in practice, so that it could 
mislead the public, as the users of information, 
and ultimately result in excessive expectations of 
the government agencies. 
This research specifically focuses on three 
roles of performance measurement systems 
(operational, incentives, and exploratory) and 
three organizational factors (contractibility, 
management commitment, and legislative man-
date). This research also investigates whether the 
institutional isomorphism occurs in the 
implementation of the performance measure-
ment systems and accountability in the public 
sector organizations. This research is based on 
the institutional theory, as one of the theories 
that are appropriate to explain that the changes 
in public sector organizations are heavily 
influenced by the external environment to 
simply gain legitimacy and political support 
(Ashworth et al., 2009). 
This study uses the SEM-PLS approach to 
analyze and test the research model. The results 
of the study were found by conducting surveys 
and interviews with officials from government 
agencies (SKPD), which found evidence that 
management commitment was positively 
associated with accountability and organiza-
tional performance. The study also found a 
positive relationship between the legislative 
mandate and accountability. Management com-
2016 Ahyaruddin and  Akbar 3 
mitment is a form of normative isomorphism 
which is necessary for organizations. While the 
legislative mandate is a form of coercive 
isomorphism which is considered to be one 
aspect of the successful implementation of 
reforms in the public sector organizations. 
However, this research has not been able to 
provide empirical support for the relationship of 
the three roles for the use of a performance 
measurement system that was predicted to have 
an impact on the organizational performance. 
Likewise, the relationship between contrac-
tibility and accountability has no significant 
support with organizational performance. 
The results of this study contribute to the 
public sector management accounting literature 
and provide a strong indication that the insti-
tutional theory is appropriate for use in explain-
ing the context of public sector organizations. 
This study also contributes to the public sector 
organizations, especially the government 
agencies in the local government of Yogyakarta, 
to implement the appropriate performance 
measurement systems in order to achieve 
efficiency and effectiveness in their organi-
zations. Finally, this study provides recommen-
dations to the government to improve its 
accountability and public services in order to 
realize a faster and improved social welfare 
programme. 
Overall this paper is organized as follows: 
the first section of this paper describes the 
problem and the context of the overall study 
which were discussed in the introduction. Then 
the next section discusses the literature review 
and hypotheses development, the research 
methods, and the results of the study and 
discussion. The final section of this paper 
presents the conclusions, implications, the 
limitations of the study and suggestions for 
further research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Institutional theory 
The institutional theory is a sociological 
theory that seeks to explain the structure of 
organizations (Scott, 1995). This theory 
describes a structure in which an organization 
adopts something in accordance with the code of 
ethics and culture that leads to legitimacy and 
support from external organizations. DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) suggested that along with 
time, in an area that is well-established, organi-
zations tend to move toward homogenization, 
although at first they show a fairly large 
diversity. An appropriate term to describe the 
process of homogenization is isomorphism. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguished 
two types of isomorphism: the competitive 
isomorphism and the institutional isomorphism. 
The competitive isomorphism relates to the 
efficiency (technical or economic explanations) 
and chooses a way that is cheaper, better, or 
more efficient for doing things. While the 
institutional isomorphism develops according to 
three mechanisms: the coercive, mimetic, and 
normative (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
coercive isomorphism comes from political 
influence and legitimacy problems. The pressure 
comes from formal or informal pressures from 
other organizations. While the mimetic isomor-
phism arises as a result of a process in response 
to the uncertainty of an environment in the area 
where the organization operates. When there is 
uncertainty, organizations tend to imitate other 
parties in order to achieve legitimacy. Finally, 
the normative isomorphism is usually associated 
with professionalism and ways of formal and 
informal collaboration that can lead to the 
homogenization of organizations (Akbar et al., 
2012). 
Several studies adopted the isomorphism 
theory, and assumed that the organization did 
not only compete for resources and customers, 
but also for political power and institutional 
legitimacy (Akbar et al., 2012). The institutional 
theory suggests that the organizations, in pursuit 
of legitimacy, adjust the isomorphic pressures 
that exist in the environment (Ashworth et al., 
2009). Therefore this theory is very relevant by 
explaining the use of performance measurement 
systems as one of the NPM’s concepts that is 
expected to provide benefits from the improved 
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efficiency, accountability and service quality of 
public sector organizations. 
Accountability 
Accountability has been described as one of 
the golden concepts that no one can be against 
(Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). Bovens (2007) 
argued that accountability is increasingly being 
used in political discourse and policy documents 
because it conveys an image of transparency and 
trustworthiness. Roberts and Scapens (1985) as 
cited by Sinclair (1995) said that accountability 
required a relationship in which a person was 
asked to explain and take responsibility for their 
actions. However, Sinclair (1995) said that the 
definition of accountability depends on the 
ideologies, motifs, and language of our times. 
Sinclair (1995) suggests that accountability has 
dicipline specific meanings and can be defined 
from various perspectives. For example, an 
auditor discusses accountability as if it is a 
financial or numerical matter, a political scien-
tists views accountability as a political impera-
tive and legal scholars as a constitutional 
arrangement, while philosophers views accoun-
tability as a subset of ethics (Iyoha and Oyerinde 
2010 ). The definition proposed by Sinclair 
(1995) which related to accountability, included 
five forms of accountability, namely: political 
accountability, public accountability, managerial 
accountability, professional accountability, and 
personal accountability. 
Many researchers define accountability in 
accordance with the context and conditions of 
each. In the context of public sector organiza-
tions, Inaga (1991) as cited by Iyoha and 
Oyerinde (2010) said that accountability requires 
governments to give a reason related to the 
source and utilization of the public resources. 
Accountability in this context is related to the 
supervision and control of the government's 
behavior, preventing the development of 
concentrations of power, and enhancing the 
learning capacity and effectiveness of the public 
administration (Iyoha and Oyerinde, 2010). In 
the system of constitutional government, there 
are two types of accountability: (1) internal 
accountability, which is a type of direct accoun-
tability that applies to a particular organizational 
system and involves direct reporting by 
subordinates to the superiors who hold power, 
and (2) external accountability, which is an 
indirect type of accountability that involves 
reporting to bodies outside the organization 
(Matek, 1977 as cited by Akbar, 2011). 
The Use of Performance Measurement 
Systems 
A performance measurement system is one 
of the key elements in the practice of the 
implementation of NPM. Several studies 
addressing the different roles of these systems 
have relied on several classifications to define 
and operationalize the use of performance 
measurement systems. Spekle and Verbeeten 
(2014) classified the use of performance 
measurement systems into three: (1) the 
operational use which is related to operational 
planning and monitoring processes; (2) incen-
tives use which is related to target setting, 
incentives provision, and rewards; and (3) 
exploratory use which is related to prioritization, 
strategy management and learning, and policy 
development. 
Spekle and Verbeeten (2014) revealed that in 
the context of its operational use, a performance 
measurement system is intended to measure the 
outputs and outcomes of organizations. The 
operational use involves operational planning 
(including the use of performance metrics for the 
preparation of performance), budget allocation, 
process monitoring, and the provision of 
information. Some studies suggest that this role 
is commonly used within an organization as a 
basic requirement (Hansen and Van der Stede, 
2004; Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). Hansen and 
Van der Stede (2004) in their research found that 
operational planning, performance evaluation, 
and strategy formulation have positive impacts 
on the performance of organizational units. 
Furthermore, in relation to incentives, a 
performance measurement system has a major 
presence in the language of the NPM, in trying 
to apply the principles and practices of private 
sector management to the public sector 
(Newberry and Pallot, 2004). To promote 
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efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability in 
the public sector, NPM encourages the idea of a 
performance contract mechanism in which 
measurable and clear performance targets should 
be able to guide the efforts of public officials 
towards the achievement of the organizational 
objectives. In this view, performance measu-
rement systems are supposed to create incentives 
that help to align individual goals with the 
organizational objectives, provide valuable 
feedback information on the progress in 
achieving these objectives, and form a basis for 
internal and external accountability (Cavalluzzo 
and Ittner, 2004; Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). 
Hansen and Mowen (2007) revealed that 
incentive provision is closely related to perfor-
mance. The objectives are to create appropriate 
goals, so that the manager can show the best 
performance of the company or organization. 
Similar was also expressed by Ichniowski et al. 
(1997) who suggested that high performance 
depends essentially on a program of incentives 
in association with job support, which includes 
an assessment of the work, uniform information, 
and job security. The incentive is one of more 
powerful motivations for employees to improve 
the quality of their performance. 
The last of the performance measurement 
system’s roles is its exploratory use. An 
exploratory use is conceptually associated with 
interactive use, and corresponds to strategy 
formulation and the communication of goals, 
strategy management and learning, and the 
strategic decision making role (Spekle and 
Verbeeten, 2014). Results from the research 
conducted by Spekle and Verbeeten (2014) 
suggest that the use of performance measure-
ment systems for exploratory purposes can affect 
organizational performance. This is because the 
exploratory use of performance measurement 
systems can communicate strategy, and the 
communication will eliminate ambiguity and 
confusion about the organization’s objectives. 
Thus, the organization will get fit and focused in 
pursuit of its mission and then can intrinsically 
motivate its public sector managers and 
employees (Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). 
Therefore, based on these explanations, the 
hypotheses can be formulated as follows: 
H1:  The use of performance measurement 
systems for operational purposes is posi-
tively associated with performance. 
H2:  The use of performance measurement 
systems for incentive purposes is positively 
associated with performance. 
H3:  The use of performance measurement sys-
tems for exploratory purposes is positively 
associated with performance. 
Contractibility and Performance 
Hofstede (1981) extended the contingency 
framework to public sector organizations and 
suggested that result controls would be very 
useful when an organization’s objectives were 
unambiguous, outputs were measurable, acti-
vities carried out repeatedly, and the effect of 
management interventions could be known. 
Spekle and Verbeeten (2014) used the term 
“contractibility” as an indicator of the degree in 
which the three following conditions can be met 
simultaneously: (1) there is a clear objective and 
an unambiguous organization, (2) performance 
can be measured in a way that is consistent with 
the achievement organization’s ultimate objec-
tives, and (3) organizational actors know and 
control the transformation process and are able 
to predict the likely outcomes of alternative 
courses of action. 
Results of the research conducted by Spekle 
and Verbeeten (2014) found that contractibility 
has a direct influence on performance. Some 
literature also shows that clarity and the mea-
surable objectives of organizations can contri-
bute to performance. In public sector organiza-
tions, low contractibility will cause their 
employees or actors to be unable to determine 
satisfactory performance attributes. This happens 
because systematic influence managers to the 
outcomes is restricted or unknown (Spekle and 
Verbeeten, 2014). Therefore, based on the 
explanations, a hyphotesis can be formulated as 
follows: 
H4:  Contractibility is positively associated with 
performance 
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Management commitment 
Management commitment is one of the 
important factors in the use and implementation 
of performance measurement systems by public 
sector organizations. Management commitment 
is an emotional attachment, and a form of 
loyalty, by people who are members of the 
organization, and who devote their attention, 
ideas, and responsibilities in order to achieve the 
missions, values, and goals of their organization 
(Primarisanti, 2013). The implementation of a 
performance measurement system will be 
successful if there is support and commitment 
from all the elements that exist within the 
organization, starting from the top level, and 
working down through the middle and lower 
levels. There are two important characteristics of 
management or organizational commitment, 
which are a strong belief in, and acceptance of, 
the values and goals of the organization, and a 
willingness to exert all of one’s efforts on behalf 
of the organization (Porter et al., 1974; Angle 
and Perry, 1981 in Sholihin and Pike, 2009). 
Several empirical studies reveal that mana-
gement commitment can lead to improved 
performance and accountability. Sholihin and 
Pike (2009) in their research found results that 
showed organizational commitment is positively 
associated with performance. Cavalluzzo and 
Ittner (2004) suggested that management 
commitment had a positive effect on the deve-
lopment of performance indicators, performance 
accountability and the use of performance 
information generated by the implementation of 
performance measurement systems. Meanwhile, 
research was conducted by Akbar et al. (2012) 
suggesting that management commitment had a 
positive effect on internal and external accoun-
tability. So also with the results of the study by 
Primarisanti (2013), who found that manage-
ment commitment had a positive effect on 
performance accountability. Therefore, based on 
the outcomes of such research, hyphoteses can 
be formulated as follows:  
H5:  Management commitment is positively 
associated with performance 
H6:  Management commitment is positively 
associated with accountability 
Legislative mandate 
The institutional theory indicates that a 
legislative mandate (or regulatory requirements) 
is a relevant factor for organizations to success-
fully implement reforms in government organi-
zations (Brignall and Modell, 2000). Akbar et al. 
(2012) in their research also found that a 
legislative mandate was positively associated 
with internal and external accountability. In the 
context of the public sector organizations in 
Indonesia, the existing legislative mandate is 
associated with the regulations and legislation. 
Each government organization should comply 
with the rules and laws made by the government, 
so in this case, the rules or regulations are 
forcing an organization to implement them. 
Based on this, it can be said that the concept 
of isomorphism, particularly the coercive 
mechanisms as revealed by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) may occur in the practices of 
public sector organizations in Indonesia. 
Moreover, this was confirmed by Talbot’s 
(2008) study on public sector organizations in 
the UK which revealed that public managers 
assess the law as one of the main drivers of 
change. So in this case, a legislative mandate is 
considered to be an important aspect for the 
success of any innovations which relate to the 
performance measurement’s practice and 
accountability. Therefore, a hyphotesis can be 
proposed as follows: 
H7:  A legislative mandate is positively asso-
ciated with accountability 
Accountability and Performance 
Various studies on NPM initiatives were 
based on the assumption that enhanced 
accountability would improve performance 
(Chistensen and Laegreid, 2014). Accountability 
is a complex and multi-faceted notion, so the 
possible influence of accountability on perfor-
mance has been problematic and inconclusive, 
not least because performance is complex, multi-
faceted, and difficult to measure (Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2011; Hyndman and Eden, 2001). 
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Nevertheless, accountability in the NPM concept 
is often perceived as a tool for enhancing a 
government's ability to deliver the public goods 
and services, that is, its ability to demonstrate 
performance more efficiently and effectively 
(Dubnick, 2005; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). 
Schillemans (2011) argued that enhancing 
the horizontal accountability of an executive 
agency may improve the organizational learning 
but not the democratic controls. Pollitt (2008) 
critically examined the proposition that a 
performance management system would 
increase the accountability of agencies, to the 
people and the political representation. His 
research used two case studies, the National 
Health Service in the United Kingdom and the 
World Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank. His research concluded that performance 
measurement cannot increase political accoun-
tability. But some researchers reject the assump-
tion that accountability should have positive and 
negative effects. While Dubnick (2005) argued 
that the idea that accountability increased 
performance has been accepted without careful 
scrutiny, and he claimed that there was an 
"accountability paradox" in which accountability 
actually diminished organizational performance. 
Meanwhile, Yowi (2011) found that the develop-
ment of performance measurement systems 
directly affects performance accountability and 
the use of performance information. Her 
research also found an indirect effect between 
the development of performance measurement 
systems and the use of performance information 
through performance accountability. Based on 
the outcome of such reseachs and arguments, the 
following hypothesis is formulated: 
H8:  Accountability is positively associated with 
performance 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This study used a mixed methods approach 
to answer our research question. One of the 
mixed method designs used in this study was the 
explanatory sequantial. This is a design of the 
mixed method that allows a researcher to collect 
data through two phases: the quantitative and 
qualitative phases (Creswell and Clark, 2011). 
The first phase involves the collection and 
analysis of quantitative data obtained through 
surveys using research instruments. Then, based 
on the results of the quantitative analysis, the 
researcher implements the second phase, the 
collection and analysis of qualitative data 
obtained through semi-structured interviews to 
explain the initial findings and explore in greater 
depth the information given by the respondents. 
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Sample  
The study was conducted in the Province of 
Yogyakarta (DIY). The object of this study were 
the senior executive officers at the work units 
(SKPD) in five districts/cities in DIY. The 
sampling method used is a purposive sampling 
with the minimal criteria that the officers be at 
least in the fourth echelon, have responsibilities 
and adequate experience and have been involved 
in the organization's strategic planning process 
and the preparation of performance reports, and 
are believed to understand the situation and 
condition of the environmental organization. 
These samples in DIY were chosen because the 
performance of governance in this province 
occupies the top position in the rankings, and is 
the best among all the other provinces, and the 
performance was above the national average 
with a value of 6.80 (Indonesia Governance 
Index, 2013). Audit results also showed good 
performance which was reflected in the Local 
Government Financial Statement (LKPD) which 
received an unqualified opinion (WTP) for four 
of the six existing LKPDs in DIY (BPK, 2014).  
Operational Definition and Variables 
Measurement  
Performance. The performance variable is 
an endogenous variable, which is measured 
using an instrument of Spekle and Verbeeten 
(2014) and was developed previously by Van de 
Ven and Ferry (1980). The instrument is speci-
fically designed to measure the performance of 
public sector organizations and has been used in 
several previous studies, such as the study by 
Williams et al. (1990), Dunk and Lysons (1997), 
Verbeeten (2008), and Spekle and Verbeeten 
(2014). The performance dimensions include: 
(1) productivity, (2) quality or accuracy of the 
work produced, (3) number of innovations, 
process improvements, or new ideas, (4) 
reputation for work excellence, (5) attainment of 
production or service level goals, (6) efficiency 
of operations, and (7) morale of the unit’s 
personnel. 
Accountability. Based on the study of Akbar 
et al. (2012), accountability consisted of two 
concepts: internal and external accountability. 
Internal accountability is a type of direct 
accountability that applies to a particular 
organization’s systems and involves direct 
reporting by subordinates to their superiors who 
hold power. External accountability is an 
indirect type of accountability that involves 
reporting to outside organizations (Matek, 1977 
as cited by Akbar, 2011). The instrument was 
adopted from Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004), 
Akbar et al. (2012) and Wang (2002) with some 
adjustments based on the context of Indonesia. 
The Use of a Performance Measurement 
System. This variable is an exogenous variable 
that includes operational use, incentives use, and 
exploratory use. The variable was measured 
using various categories of performance metrics 
for a particular purpose. The categories consisted 
of input measures, process measures, output 
measures, quality measures, and outcome 
measures (Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). The 
instrument was adopted from Spekle and 
Verbeeten (2014). 
Contractibility. The contractibility variables 
are exogenous variables and were adopted from 
the study of Spekle and Verbeeten (2014), they 
are a formative construct and include three 
indicators: (1) the clarity of the organization’s 
mission and goals, (2) the measurability of 
outputs in terms of achieving the goals, and (3) 
knowledge of the transformation process. The 
three indicators were measured using a 1-5 
Likert scale consisting of item related questions 
within this construct. Items questioned in the 
questionnaire were adopted from Spekle and 
Verbeeten (2014), Verbeeten (2008) and Withey 
et al. (1983). 
Management commitment. The manage-
ment commitment variable was used to measure 
how intensively official public sector organi-
zations were committed to improving accoun-
tability and organizational performance. This 
variable is an exogenous variable and the 
question items refer to the instrument of 
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Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) and Nurkhamid 
(2008). 
Legislative mandate. The legislative man-
date is associated with the involvement of 
subordinates and superiors in activities which 
relate to the performance accountability reports 
by government agencies. This variable is an 
exogenous variable and was measured using the 
measurement instrument of Akbar et al. (2012). 
Data Analysis Methods 
The quantitative data were analyzed using a 
variety of inferential statistical tests such as a 
validity test, reliability test, descriptive statistics, 
and multivariate analysis. Hypotheses were 
tested using the SEM-PLS approach with 
WarpPLS 3.0 software. SEM-PLS was used 
because it was able to test several dependent and 
independent variables simultaneously (Gudono, 
2012; Akbar, 2011; Barclay et al., 1995). SEM-
PLS can also estimate the model with a 
relatively small sample size, does not require the 
fulfillment of assumptions such as normality and 
goodness of fit models, and can be done without 
a strong theoretical basis (Latan and Gudono, 
2013; Sholihin and Ratmono, 2013). Evaluation 
of the PLS model is done by evaluating the 
measurement model and the structural model. 
The qualitative phase of this study was the 
second phase, which involved the investigation 
and exploration of respondent answers or 
experiences through semi-structured and open 
interviews. Qualitative data was analyzed using 
a thematic content analysis. This is a method for 
identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns 
(themes) in a group of data (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). Qualitative data was collected from the 
transcripts of the interviews that were held with 
the respondents, or from other texts that could 
explain the research topic. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS OF THE 
STUDY 
Quantitative Analysis 
Pilot study. A pilot study was conducted 
before the research instrument was sent to the 
actual respondents. The pilot study was carried 
out on 32 local government officials who were 
studying in the Master of Economics Develop-
ment (MEP) programme of the Faculty of 
Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah 
Mada. The data were analyzed using WarpPLS 
software version 3.0. Analysis of the data was 
required for the validity construct criteria with a 
loading factor greater than 0.70, but a loading 
factor of between 0.40 - 0.60 was still 
considered, while a loading factor under 0.40 
was excluded. The result of the validity test 
showed that there were two items which had a 
loading factor under 0.40, and these items were 
then immediately removed from the research 
instrument (two items of contractibility 
constructs). In addition, reliability testing should 
also have met a minimum requirement of 0.60 as 
indicated from the composite reliability values 
and Conbach's alpha. The results showed that all 
the criteria of validity and reliability have met 
the requirement, and the questions were 
reasonable for further use. 
Quantitative Data Collection. Quantitative 
data was conducted through a survey by sending 
questionnaires to each SKPDs district/city in the 
DIY. The survey was conducted starting on 
November the 5th to December the 8th, 2014. The 
number of questionnaires sent out were 184, and 
146 questionnaires were returned for a response 
rate of 79.3 percent. However, nine of the 
returned questionnaires were not filled in 
completely and were excluded from the analysis 
so only the remaining 137 questionnaires could 
be analyzed for an effective response rate of 93.8 
pecent. The number of questionnaires returned 
that could be analyzed provided an overview of 
the demographic profile of the respondents and 
is shown in Table 1 below. 
Non-Response Bias. The quantitative data 
collection took approximately one month, so to 
ensure there was no non-respone bias from the 
respondents from the time differences in 
returning the questionnaires, a Mann-Whitney 
test was carried out to make sure that there was 
no difference among the initial and final 
responses. The test results showed that for all the 
variables used between the 80 initial responses 
and the 57 final responses, there was no 
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difference, with the significance score above five 
percent (>0.05). The Mann-Whitney test gave 
the following results for each variable: perfor-
mance (0.346), contractibility (0.371), 
accountability (0.858), legislative mandate 
(0.928), commitment management (0.506), 
operational use (0.075), incentive use (0.111), 
and exploratory use (0.638). Furthermore, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to ensure no 
differences among the sampling regions. This 
test is necessarily because the data were obtained 
from various different regions including five 
districts/cities in DIY (Yogyakarta, Bantul, 
Gunung Kidul, Kulon Progo, and Sleman). The 
test results show that all the variables for each 
region have a significance value above 0.05. 
This result concludes that there was no differ-
ence among the five sampling regions in this 
study. 
Hypotheses testing. The hypotheses were 
tested using SEM-PLS with a bootstrapping 
function in WarpPLS software. Before testing 
the hypotheses, the measurement model in SEM-
PLS was evaluated first, to test the validity and 
reliability of construct. 
 
Table 1. Demographic Profile of Respondents (N=137) 
Respondent 
Characteristics Amount 
Percentage 
(%)  
Respondent 
Characteristics Amount 
Percentage 
(%) 
Gender 
• Male 
• Female 
• Missing 
 
72 
51 
14 
 
52.6% 
37.2% 
10.2% 
 Level of Education 
• High School 
• Diploma 
• Graduate  
• Postgraduate 
• Doctor 
• Missing 
 
1 
6 
66 
49 
1 
14 
 
0.7% 
4.4% 
48.2% 
35.8% 
0.7% 
10.2% 
Position 
• Echelon II 
• Echelon III 
• Echelon IV 
• Missing 
 
4 
36 
79 
18 
 
2.9% 
26.3% 
57.7% 
13.1% 
 Experience 
• <2 
• 2-5 
• 6-10 
• 11-15 
• >15 
• Missing 
 
- 
3 
4 
16 
100 
14 
 
- 
2.2% 
2.9% 
11.7% 
73% 
10.2% 
Age 
• <30 
• 30-40 
• 41-50 
• >50 
• Missing 
 
4 
15 
63 
40 
15 
 
2.9% 
11% 
46% 
29.2% 
10.9% 
 Length of Service 
• <2 
• 2-5 
• 6-10 
• 11-15 
• >15 
• Missing 
 
38 
61 
11 
5 
3 
19 
 
27.7% 
44.5% 
8% 
3.7% 
2.2% 
13.9% 
 
Table 2. Correlation Among Latent Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Perf 0.755 0.251 0.316 0.127 0.306 0.463 0.347 0.414 
2. OU 0.251 0.912 0.705 0.329 0.422 0.534 0.581 0.716 
3. EU 0.316 0.705 0.827 0.338 0.514 0.531 0.610 0.696 
4. Leg 0.127 0.329 0.338 0.962 0.095 0.255 0.386 0.407 
5. IU 0.306 0.422 0.514 0.095 0.934 0.306 0.317 0.458 
6. Com 0.463 0.534 0.531 0.255 0.306 0.815 0.710 0.692 
7. Cont 0.347 0.581 0.610 0.386 0.317 0.710 0.891 0.636 
8. Acc 0.414 0.716 0.696 0.407 0.458 0.692 0.636 0.877 
Source: Output Warp-PLS (2015) 
Note: Square root of AVE showed on diagonal. 
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The validity test in this study consisted of the 
convergent validity (see Table 3) which can be 
seen from the loading value, which must be 
greater than 0.50 with a p-value of <0.05, and 
the discriminant validity (see Table 2) which can 
be measured by seeing that the square root of 
AVE is greater than the correlation between the 
construct and the loading indicator, when the 
construct being measured is greater than the 
loading for the other constructs (low cross-
loadings) (Hair et al., 2006; Akbar, 2011; 
Sholihin and Ratmono, 2013). While the 
reliability test was assessed using two methods, 
Cronbach's alpha and the composite reliability 
(see Table 4), which must be greater than 0.70, 
even though a value of 0.60 is acceptable (Hair 
et al., 2010; Sholihin and Ratmono, 2013). The 
results of the validity and reliability test showed 
that all the criteria met the requirements so that 
the data from the instrument were fit for use in 
further analyzes. 
The structural model in PLS was evaluated 
by using the coefficient of determination (R2) 
and Q-Squared. The results are shown in Table 4 
below.
 
Table 3. Convergent Validity 
Variables Items Loading* P-Value  Variables Items Loading* P-Value 
 
OU 
 
 
IU 
 
 
 
 
EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Com 
 
 
 
 
 
InAcc 
OU1 
OU2 
OU3 
 
IU1 
IU2 
 
EU1 
EU2 
EU3 
EU4 
EU5 
 
Perf1 
Perf2 
Perf3 
Perf4 
Perf5 
Perf6 
Perf7 
 
Com1 
Com2 
Com3 
Com4 
Com5 
Com6 
 
InAcc1 
InAcc2 
InAcc3 
InAcc4 
0.904 
0.933 
0.899 
 
0.934 
0.934 
 
0.745 
0.865 
0.834 
0.838 
0.850 
 
0.748 
0.781 
0.793 
0.701 
0.785 
0.780 
0.694 
 
0.776 
0.818 
0.773 
0.830 
0.865 
0.824 
 
0.718 
0.803 
0.813 
0.753 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
Leg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ExAcc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clear 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Meas 
 
 
 
 
Trans 
Leg1 
Leg2 
 
ExAcc1 
ExAcc2 
ExAcc3 
ExAcc4 
ExAcc5 
ExAcc6 
ExAcc7 
ExAcc8 
 
Clear1 
Clear2 
Clear3 
Clear4 
Clear5 
 
Meas1 
Meas2 
Meas3 
Meas4 
Meas5 
Meas6 
 
Trans1 
Trans2 
Trans3 
Trans4 
0.962 
0.962 
 
0.846 
0.863 
0.896 
0.888 
0.903 
0.869 
0.813 
0.808 
 
0.836 
0.877 
0.862 
0.864 
0.806 
 
0.724 
0.526 
0.803 
0.840 
0.837 
0.812 
 
0.758 
0.706 
0.866 
0.817 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
* two items of management commitment construct (Com) have been dropped because they did not have the required loading 
score 0,50. 
Note:  Perf = Performance, InAcc = Internal Accountability, ExAcc = External Accountability, Leg = Legislative Mandate, 
Com = Management Commitment, OU = Operational Use, IU = Incentive Use, and EU = Exploratory Use, Clear = 
Clarity of mission and goals, Meas = Measurability of output, Trans = Knowledge of transformation process. 
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Table 4. Latent Variables Coefficients 
Coefficients Perf OU EU Leg IU Com Cont Acc 
R2  0.258             0.535 
Composite reliability 0.903 0.937 0.915 0.961 0.932 0.922 0.920 0.869 
Cronbach's alpha  0.874 0.899 0.884 0.919 0.853 0.898 0.870 0.699 
AVE 0.571 0.832 0.685 0.925 0.872 0.664 0.794 0.768 
Full collinearity VIFs 1.352 2.552 2.692 1.294 1.469 2.748 2.554 3.431 
Q-squared  0.240             0.533 
Source: Output Warp-PLS (2015) 
Table 4 above shows that the endogenous 
variables of accountability have a coefficient of 
determination (R2) of 0.535. These results 
indicate that the variance of the endogenous 
variables of accountability of 53.5 percent can 
be explained by the variance of the exogenous 
variables, that is the legislative mandate and 
management commitment. While the endoge-
nous variable of performance has a coefficient of 
determination (R2) of 0.258, which means that 
this variable is only able to be explained by the 
exogenous constructs of 25.8 percent, which 
means it is very weak. Furthermore, the 
relevance of the predictive in the research 
models was reflected by the Q-Squared value. 
This value must be greater than zero, which 
indicates that the exogenous latent variables 
have predictive relevance to the endogenous 
latent variables that influence them (Sholihin 
and Ratmono, 2013). The Q-Squared values 
shown in Table 5 are 0.240 for the performance 
variable and 0.533 for the accountability 
variable, which means that the predictive 
relevance of this research model is good.  
Meanwhile, the results of the hypotheses 
testing are determined by seeing the path 
coefficients, standard errors, p-values, and effect 
sizes. Details of the hypotheses testing results 
are shown in Table 5. The results testing of 
hypothesis 1 in Table 5 shows that the path 
coefficient of OU à Perf is -0.011, the p-value 
is 0.466 (>0.05), and the effect size is 0.003. 
While hypothesis 2 is shown by the path 
coefficient of Perf à IU being 0.151, the p-
value is 0.101 (>0.05), and the effect size is 
0.048. Furthermore, hypothesis 3 is shown by 
the path coefficient of EU à Perf being -0.047, 
the p-value is 0.394 (>0.05), and the effect size 
is 0.015. The results testing of hypotheses 1, 2, 
and 3 indicate that the three roles which the 
performance measurement systems are used for 
(operational, incentives, and exploratory), which 
were predicted to have a relationship with 
organizational performance, are not empirically 
confirmed, which is reflected from the p-values 
being greater than 0.05, so that hypotheses 1, 2, 
and 3 are not supported. 
 
Table 5. Hypotheses Test Result 
  Path Coefficients P-Values Standard errors Effect sizes 
OU ---> Perf -0.011 0.466 0.125 0.003 
IU ---> Perf 0.151 0.101 0.118 0.048 
EU ---> Perf -0.047 0.394 0.174 0.015 
Cont ---> Perf 0.064 0.329 0.143 0.024 
Leg ---> Acc 0.220 0.003** 0.079 0.095 
Com ---> Acc 0.628 <0.001*** 0.065 0.440 
Com ---> Perf 0.291 0.030* 0.153 0.137 
Acc ---> Perf 0.139 0.156 0.137 0.062 
Source: Output Warp-PLS (2015) 
* Significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
** Significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*** Significant at 0.001 level (2-tailed) 
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The hypothesis 4 that predicted the existence 
of a positive relationship between contractibility 
and organizational performance is also not 
empirically confirmed. It can be seen that the 
path coefficient of Cont à Perf is 0.064, the p-
value is 0.329 (>0.05), and the effect size is 
0.024. These results indicate that hypothesis 4 
was not supported. Furthermore, testing of 
hypothesis 5 shows the path coefficient of Leg 
à Acc is 0.220, the p-value is 0.003 (<0.05), 
and the effect size is 0.095. This results support 
the hypothesis that the legislative mandate was 
positively associated with accountability. 
However, the value of the effect size indicates it 
is relatively weak, as expressed by Sholihin and 
Ratmono (2013) who categorized the effect size 
into three groups: weak (0.02), medium (0.15), 
and substantial (0.35). The testing of hypothesis 
6 regarding the relationship between commit-
ment management and accountability was shown 
by the path coefficient of Com à Acc being 
0.628, the p-value is <0.001, and the effect size 
is 0.440. These results indicate that management 
commitment was positively associated with 
accountability and support the hypothesis. 
Similar results were also found in hypothesis 7, 
that management commitment was positively 
associated with organizational performance. It is 
shown from the value of the path coefficients of 
Com à Perf being 0.291, the p-value is 0.030 
(<0.05), and the effect size is 0.137. So hypo-
thesis 7 was also empirically confirmed. Finally, 
the results testing of hypothesis 8 which 
predicted a positive relationship between 
accountability and organizational performance 
has not been empirically confirmed. It can be 
seen that the path coefficient Perf à Acc is 
0.139, the p-value is 0.156 (>0.05), and the 
effect size is 0.062. These results indicate that 
accountability was not positively associated with 
organizational performance. 
Qualitative analysis 
Qualitative Data Collection. Creswell and 
Clark (2011) revealed that one way to select a 
sample of interviewees is to select the outliers of 
the data’s distribution from the results of the 
quantitative data analysis. Here the spread of the 
results of the quantitative data processing 
indicated that the outlier data could be found 
using a scatter plot graph (Figure 2). 
From the figure above, it can be seen that the 
points which are spread far from the group of 
data are outliers. Then, the data were identified 
by adjusting the number of respondents to the 
questionnaire to see whether the outliers who 
provided the data were willing to be interviewed. 
From this identification, five respondent outliers 
were fit and willing to be interviewed, so the 
five respondents were used as the sample. The 
sample consisted of two respondents from 
echelon III and three respondents from echelon 
IV, and these five people were spread across 
three regions (Sleman, Bantul, and Yogyakarta). 
          
Source: Output of the outcome of excel-managed data (2015) 
Figure 2. Scatter Plot Graph 
	 125 
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There were three men and two women involved 
in these interviews. The interviews were carried 
out face-to-face and took around 20-30 minutes 
each. The interviews were recorded using a 
voice recorder once permission was obtained 
from the interviewee. 
Qualitative Data Analysis. The qualitative 
data were analyzed using a thematic content 
analysis. The main themes raised to obtain this 
qualitative data were associated with the three-
dimensional isomorphism (coercive, mimetic, 
and normative) in the institutional theory as 
expressed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). In 
simple language, a coercive isomorphism refers 
to the pressure faced by an organization to 
change or take action; a mimetic isomorphism 
refers to the organization that mimics other 
organizations because of uncertainty; and a 
normative isomorphism refers to the norms or 
cognitive understanding of professionals. The 
three main themes became a guide to creating a 
list of relevant questions to investigate the 
possibility of isomorphic pressure during the 
process of performance measurements and 
reporting, as well as for the accountability 
practices in government agencies. The results of 
this thematic content analysis, based on the 
evidence obtained from our interviews with the 
respondents are described in more detail below: 
Coercive isomorphism 
It was revealed, based on the thematic 
content analysis of the transcripts of the inter-
views, that government officials while fulfilling 
their duties, both in terms of performance assess-
ment, performance reporting, and enhancing 
performance and accountability, were driven by 
regulations and rules. This can be seen from the 
comments of the following respondents: 
In our management, we always work based 
on the rules, so if it is associated with 
regulations concerning the improvement of 
performance, it is obviously very tight, very 
supportive, because it becomes part of our 
guidance for our work. Our position is clear 
right now, that it must be determined in 
accordance with the rules. For example, in 
the financial field, there is a term, namely 
DPA (document for budget implementation), 
it is the key, our employment contract. So 
that with regard to the rules that relate to the 
performance improvement, it is clearly 
impacted (R127, Secretary of Sub-District). 
... that's what regulations provides us, as 
actors of governance processes, a roadmap. 
For example, how the instructions regarding 
the use of money, such as, in the procure-
ment of goods and services, financial admi-
nistration, and then the management of 
services, there are three. All of the three 
programs provide us with the roadmap, step 
by step, what must be done. It gives us 
certainty. So psychologically, we have an 
uncontested guidance in the form of regula-
tions. With the certainty that it’s uncontested 
(in the process usually there are issues, 
including conflict of interests, intervention 
by the employer, and others), because we 
have the rules, it gives us a sense of 
psychological safety to implement it, so as no 
doubt, automaticly the efficiency levels of 
execution become faster in time, and its 
output can be guaranteed. (R4, Sub Head of 
Reseach & Development, Socio-Cultural, 
and Economy). 
Based on those comments, it is clear that 
institutional isomorphism in the form of coercive 
pressure occurs in the practice of the imple-
mentation of performance measurement and 
accountability in the public sector organizations 
(government agencies) in DIY. This is in line 
with what was expressed by Brignall and Modell 
(2000), that the rules and regulation are a legis-
lative mandate, and one of the relevant factors 
for the successful implementation of reforms in 
government organizations. Talbot (2008) also 
revealed the same thing, that public managers 
assess the law as one of the main drivers of a 
change. Coercive pressure in the form of this 
regulation is fair, because most government 
organizations in Indonesia have a dependency on 
the central government, in the form of financial 
resources or through a system of rewards (Akbar 
et al., 2012). There are no other options for the 
local governments and agencies, except to 
comply with the rules and report their perfor-
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mance in order to keep getting their funding 
through the budget allocations of the central 
government. 
Mimetic Isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) revealed that 
mimetic isomorphism arises as a result of a 
process to respond to the uncertainty of the 
environment in the area where the organization 
operates. When the organization has a low level 
of technology, organizational goals are not clear 
and very ambiguous, or even the organizational 
environment creates symbolic uncertainty, then 
the organization may be modelling itself to 
resemble the shape of other organizations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Results from the 
interviews with respondents have strengthened 
the research of DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in 
that the government agencies, especially the 
SKPDs in the local government of Yogyakarta 
watch and refer to other agencies when making a 
performance report, in an attempt to meet the 
regulatory requirements. 
In making a performance report, we refer to 
the local government, and there is coordina-
tion between the agencies and it is coor-
dinated by BAPPEDA (R125, Head of 
Labour). 
So far, the reporting formats at the SKPDs 
level are not clear, they require templates to 
be developed for the SKPDs level (R96, Sub 
Head of Planning and Reporting).  
Based on above comments, it is clear that 
there is no definate reporting format at the 
SKPDs level for making performance reports. 
This is one of the reasons why government 
institutions imitate or refer to other agencies’ 
reporting formats, and at the same time 
strengthen the evidence of mimetic isomorphism 
in the performance of their reporting practices. 
In addition, many emerging regulations cause 
overlapping or even contradictions between the 
rules which then leads to confusion for the 
government actors (officials) who are trying to 
implement the rules. Thus, what happens is they 
follow or imitate other organizations in making 
their performance reports. 
Normative isomorphism 
Normative pressures in the context of the 
public sector organizations usually come from 
professional groups, such as consultants or 
college through a variety of conferences, semi-
nars, workshops, training, and mentoring. The 
role of these professional groups is crucial for 
organizations in order to reduce their errors and 
to increase their chances of success in their 
performance reporting and accountability (Akbar 
et al., 2012; Han and Koo, 2010). One of the 
professional institutions, who have such a role 
and help the government agencies is the 
Development and Financial Supervisory Agency 
(BPKP). 
Yes there is help, from BPKP and from 
MENPAN. The assistance that they provide 
such as advocacy assistance, workshop, and 
they gives theories, and the participants can 
practice directly. The assistance is done 
usually once a year at the time of going to 
compile the report, then the coordinator 
makes a request with the names of the team, 
so each of the people can get training on 
LAKIP (R97, Sub Head of Job Analysis and 
Apparatus).”  
 In our agencies there is a final evaluation at 
the level of the SKPD, and later we  asked 
for consideration or suggestions for each 
field and department, for the preparation of 
materials and the performance evaluation 
during the year, such as workshops” (R96, 
Sub Head of Planning and Reporting) 
I am involved in HEPI (Association of 
Indonesian Education Evaluator), as an 
assessor in the excellent schools, to assess 
the feasibility evaluation process at the 
excellent schools. If LAKIP, we consult on 
the report with the Tata Pemerintahan, if 
such an arrangement of the report was 
appropriate or not, what needs to be altered 
or re-done, we consult with the Tata 
Pemerintahan in the local secretariat (R96, 
Sub Head of Planning and Reporting). 
In addition, government agencies also use 
consultants from universities in the process of 
program planning. This is done in order to obtain 
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optimal results. Universities are seen as institu-
tions that have the required knowledge and also 
excellent academic qualifications, which are 
expected to assist the organization in the mana-
gement practices of the government agencies. 
This fact is true, according to the results of 
research interviews with government officials. 
In the planning-namely workforce planning 
of Sleman district, this program was helped 
by consultants from UGM. Not only that, the 
Sleman district became a pilot project for the 
SMART City, the city based IT city construc-
tion whose consultants came from ITB. In 
Indonesia there are seven cities that became 
pilot projects. In Sleman, this project was 
handled by BAPPEDA, we only helped the 
project because we do IT, such as card 
services AK 1 (yellow card), our service has 
been ISO 9001 2008 certified (R125, Head of 
Labor). 
Thus, it is clear that public sector organi-
zations, especially those in the local government 
of Yogyakarta Province obtain great benefit 
from professional groups such as the BPKP or 
the universities, in the practice of their perfor-
mance measurements and accountability of their 
organizations. So this condition strengthens the 
evidence that the normative isomorphism also 
occurs in the process of an organization trying to 
get the best practices for its management of the 
organization. Evidence of the normative 
isomorphism in the reporting of the performance 
of government agencies is also found in previous 
studies by Akbar et al. (2012). 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
The results of the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses found strong evidence for the influence 
of management commitment as one of the 
organizational factors that have an impact on the 
accountability and performance of public sector 
organizations. Management commitment is a 
form of normative isomorphism which is 
necessary for organizations. Public sector 
managers are required to give reasons and be 
responsible to the public for their utilization of 
public resources. This finding was consistent 
with many we found in the literature that said 
that management commitment can affect the 
performance improvement (Sholihin and Pike, 
2009), the development of performance indi-
cators, the use of performance information, and 
the performance accountability (Cavalluzzo and 
Ittner, 2004; Primarisanti, 2013), as well as the 
internal and external accountability (Akbar et al., 
2012). This result was also confirmed by the 
following respondents comments: 
Management commitment at the top mana-
gement level, in the management control 
system there is usually a term ‘turn of the 
top’. So the leaders who will maintain and 
regulate the rhythm of the organization 
which is carrying out the task, would take it 
quickly, then go slowly, then go straight, 
because of ‘turn of the top’ (R127, Secretary 
of Sub-District). 
Furthermore, the results of this study also 
found evidence that the legislative mandate has a 
positive association with accountability. Our 
findings suggest that the pressure, in the form of 
regulations from the central government, is still 
quite strong despite the decentralization that has 
been on-going for more than a decade. The 
legislative mandate is a form of coercive isomor-
phism which is considered to be one aspect of 
the successful implementation of reforms in the 
public sector organizations in Indonesia, 
especially in the local government of DIY. The 
results of the qualitative data analysis also found 
the mimetic isomorphism in actual practice. This 
finding was evident from government agencies, 
especially the SKPDs, which referred to other 
agencies in making their performance reports in 
an attempt to meet the regulatory requirements. 
These findings lead to the conclusion that 
institutional isomorphism is really happening in 
actual everyday practices and plays a strong role 
in the implementation process of the perfor-
mance measurement systems and accountability 
of the public sector organizations, especially the 
SKPD. 
Meanwhile, contrary to our hypothesis, the 
use of performance measurement systems for 
operational and exploratory purposes have a 
negative impact on performance. This indicates 
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that the operational roles that are commonly 
used in organizations as a basic requirement 
(Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004; Spekle and 
Verbeeten, 2014) are actually only a formality in 
the performance of work obligations. The role 
does not have a special purpose designed to 
improve performance and the achievement of 
organizational outcomes. These were reinforced 
by the statement of the following respondents: 
Actually it never happened (using existing 
information in LAKIP), which occurred as 
just a formality. So actually, LAKIP must 
report in a timely manner,using the appro-
priate formats, in accordance like this, like 
that, report to DEPDAGRI (Department of 
the Interior), to BAPPENAS (National Deve-
lopment Planning Agency), but in reality it is 
just reported, the information is not used for 
anything. Whether the achievement of 
Minimum Service Standards (MSS) should 
be so, be meaningful, sometimes did not 
anyway. For example, we have data, from 
year to year, the percentage of homes that 
are not licensed, since the existing licensing 
agency was created, but instead of going 
down, the percentage rises. It means that the 
data, the report, was not used for anything 
by the government, no action taken, it should 
get action to make it clear (R4, Sub Head of 
Reseach & Development, Socio-Cultural, 
and Economy). 
Furthermore, in regarding the role of explo-
ratory use, it requires a search value and higher 
learning to improve performance (Abernethy and 
Brownell, 1999). When additional insights into 
the process of improving decision-making and 
resource allocation does not exist, then the 
tendency to be able to improve the performance 
reduces. The role of exploratory use requires top 
management’s time, broad organizational 
involvement and increased interaction among the 
members of the organization (Simons, 2000 in 
Speke and Verbeeten, 2014), as well as commu-
nication strategies to eliminate ambiguity and 
confusion about the organizational goals (Spekle 
and Verbeeten, 2014). 
Besides, different results were also found in 
the use of performance measurement systems for 
incentive-oriented schemes, which had a very 
weak relationship with performance. This result 
was consistent with Spekle and Verbeeten 
(2014), that the effect of incentives on perfor-
mance will be high when there is high 
contractibility (i.e clear goals, performance/ 
outputs that are measurable, and knowledge of 
the transformation process). This indicates that 
in order to improve performance and promote 
efficiency and effectiveness in public sector 
organizations, we need a mechanism of perfor-
mance contracting in which the performance 
targets can be clear and measurable in order that 
the government actors can achieve the organi-
zational goals (Spekle and Verbeeten, 2014). 
This mechanism is important for aligning 
incentives and performance. It is also reinforced 
by the comments of the following respondents: 
We want to make it (the system of incentives 
related to employee performance), we have 
created the system. So what a person does 
earns points, then for the points that we set 
there is an incentive (Rupiah). Thus, in a 
period such as a month, an employee can 
accumulate reward points and later can get 
many Rupiah. But this time is not yet, we are 
making the system, later in 2015 we will test 
it, if the result is good, then the policy 
decision-making is determined by our top 
management (R97, Sub Head of Job Analysis 
and Apparatus). 
The performance is related to the person, not 
the leadership, so cherish the human, cherish 
the person. During this time, our personnel 
management system has never give the 
opportunity for personnal achievements. For 
example, riding position is four years in 
once, but how to get that position is not 
clear, you must be close to who, or capable 
of what is also not clear. The system should 
be made clear (R4, Sub Head of Reseach & 
Development, Socio-Cultural, and Econo-
my). 
With regard to contractibility, this study 
found no association between contractibility and 
performance. This result may have occurred 
because, in the context of public sector organi-
zations, government officials or actors cannot 
18 Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business January 
fully determine the satisfactory performance 
attributes. This happens because the managers’ 
systematic influence on the ultimate outcome 
was restricted or unknown (Spekle and 
Verbeeten, 2014). If the organizations were 
unable to specify or define what they want from 
their managers, performance metrics cannot 
provide much guidance, and management con-
trol becomes political control (Hofstede, 1981). 
Similar results were also found in the 
relationship between accountability and perfor-
mance, which did not have a significant effect. 
Some literature still indicates a debatable 
influence of accountability on performance, but 
it is inconclusive. This is because performance 
itself is complex, multi-faceted, and difficult to 
measure (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011; 
Hyndman and Eden, 2001). Moreover, accoun-
tability in the public sector organizations is 
probably not uniformly understood by the 
government officials as well as civil society. It is 
because accountability has many dimensions and 
can be defined from various perspectives 
(Sinclair, 1995). 
Implication 
This study provides some interesting contri-
butions and implications to the academic 
literature and practices. First, theoretically, the 
institutional isomorphism, as one of the parts of 
the institutional theory used in this study, was 
recognized as a basic framework that was able to 
explain the implementation practices of perfor-
mance measurement systems and accountability 
in public sector organizations, especially at the 
local government level in DIY. Second, metho-
dologically, the use of mixed methods research 
by combining two approaches (quantitative and 
qualitative) were of great benefit and provided a 
robustness in the results. This approach was able 
to answer complex research problems and could 
explain various things and situations in more 
detail than just one approach. 
Finally, this study has practical implications 
for the actors of public sector organizations, that 
performance measurement systems are an 
important component in the structure of the 
management control system. Public sector mana-
gers need to consider various aspects in order to 
achieve efficiency and effectiveness in their 
organizations, for example, what to measure, 
how to measure it, and also how they should use 
the performance information related to condi-
tions encountered in the field. Public sector 
organizations also need to pay greater attention 
to the commitment of member organizations, 
especially the top managements’ commitment. 
This is because the managements’ commitment 
provides a great contribution to the improvement 
of performance and accountability. In addition, 
policy makers need to increase their efforts to 
encourage government agencies to improve the 
accountability and performance of public 
services in order to realize their effectiveness 
and social welfare. 
Limitations and Suggestions 
As with other empirical studies, this study 
has some weaknesses and limitations. Firstly, the 
study was conducted only on public sector 
organizations in Yogyakarta, which limited the 
scope of the SKPD. Further research should 
enlarge their population areas and expand the 
scope of the public sector organizations, not only 
for the SKPD, but also other public sector 
organizations that provide public services such 
as hospitals and educational institutions. Second-
ly, the accountability variable in this study was 
defined only by internal and external accoun-
tability. However accountability can be defined 
in many dimensions, such as: political accoun-
tability, public accountability, managerial 
accountability, professional accountability, and 
personal accountability (Sinclair, 1995). There-
fore, further research should identify the five 
dimensions of accountability, in relation to the 
organizational performance. Finally, this study 
did not explore to any great depth the hypotheses 
that were not supported, this is because the 
method used in this study only used an expla-
natory sequential design that aimed to capture 
the phenomena of isomorphism. Thus, further 
research could explore in more detail the infor-
mation from respondents using other designs, 
such as exploratory, transformative, and 
triangulation. 
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